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Abstract: The research to-date on pro-government militias demonstrates that numerous 
pro-regime militia groups were actively deployed in civil wars over the last half a 
century. As hundreds of militia groups emerged amid civil warfare, hundreds more were 
disbanded, integrated into regular military or transformed into political forces. This 
study seeks to improve our understanding of global patterns of militia demobilisation. In 
contrast to the growing body of literature that explores the emergence of militias or 
examines their relationship with the state, studies on the demise of pro-government 
militias are notable by their absence. Statistical analysis of 220 pro-government militias 
involved in 75 civil wars from 1981 to 2011, based on a recent database of pro-
government militias, demonstrates that the disappearance of militias has little to do with 
the termination of armed conflict. This study is first to investigate when and under which 
conditions militias created to assist governments in fighting civil wars disband.  
 
Keywords: armed conflict, armed groups, pro-government militias, paramilitary, civil 
war 
 
The past decade had witnessed radical transition from the perception of intrastate conflict 
as a dyadic phenomenon involving governments and rebels,1 towards a multi-actor model 
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accounting for the involvement of numerous non-state actors.2 Of all other extra-state 
actors, pro-government militias (PGMs)3 have been a prominent attribute of most civil 
wars from the Cold War period to the present day.4 As estimated by Carey, Colaresi and 
Mitchell,5 58% of pro-government militias emerged in the midst of civil wars and over 
80% of civil wars since 1989 employed at least one PGM at various phases of the 
conflict.6 From the Peruvian Rondas Campesinas and Argentina’s “Working Groups” to 
the Sudanese Janjaweed and Serb “Arkan’s Tigers,” PGMs never disappeared from the 
civil wars’ lexicon. More recent armed conflicts have led to the emergence of such militia 
groups as the Iraqi Shiite militia (al-Hashed al-Sha’bi), Ukrainian Volunteer Battalions 
(Volontery), the Yemeni Popular Committees, Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force, Syrian 
Shabihha, as well as numerous Libyan PGMs. Although research on pro-government 
militias only began burgeoning over the past several years, the existing literature on 
militia violence offers a compelling account on the emergence, functions and 
performance of PGMs. A growing number of theoretical works7 is matched by even 
greater body of empirical literature.8  
The current literature on PGMs, however, does little to explain when and how PGMs 
cease to exist. Which factors account for the demise of militia organisations? When and 
how militias involved in civil wars disband? As observed by Jentzsch and her co-
authors,9 little is known as to what happens to militias after the end of civil wars. Some 
studies have observed that PGMs may prove resilient to changes even when the 
conditions on the ground transform.10 Nevertheless, these few empirical observations 
have failed to translate into nuanced evidence-supported analysis of the causes of PGMs’ 
end. The goal of this article is to fill the gap in the literature on militia violence through a 
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rigorous quantitative analysis of the relationship between the end of civil wars and the 
demise of PGMs.  
This study advances the theoretical argument that the end of armed conflict does not 
necessarily cause the demobilisation of pro-regime militias involved in civil wars. In 
contrast to other types of armed groups, such as anti-regime rebels, militias disband either 
before the end of conflict or well after its termination. The central argument rests upon 
three hypothetical assumptions as to when militias might be expected to demobilise.  
Firstly, militias are more likely to disband when the war is over if the conflict ends in 
favour of the incumbent. Secondly, with longer conflict duration, militias are more likely 
to become burdensome for governments and therefore they have lower chances 
witnessing the end of conflict in protracted civil wars. Lastly, provided that governments 
are still interested in militia’ services, they are likely to persist beyond the civil war’s 
active phase in countries with unresolved conflicts. These assumptions are empirically 
tested on a sample of 220 pro-government militias involved in 75 civil wars from 1981 to 
2011. Descriptive statistics, logit regression and Cox proportional hazards models are 
employed as the key methods of enquiry.  
This article is organised as follows. I begin by reviewing the existing literature on 
PGMs in civil wars and highlighting the gaps in research. In the following two sections I 
discuss and theoretically ground three hypotheses that will be tested empirically in further 
parts of the article. I then present data used in the analysis and describe quantitative 
methods employed to test the hypotheses. The section on data and methodology is 
followed by the analysis of empirical findings. The discussion of empirical results is 
 4 
 
followed by a concluding section that sums up theoretical and practical implications of 
this study.   
 
Pro-government militias in civil wars  
 
Large-N analyses on militias have only began emerging recently, and, notwithstanding 
the burgeoning of research on PGMs over the last several years, the role of militias in 
civil wars has rarely been addressed explicitly. Research to-date has focused on pro-
government militias’ role in genocide and civilian targeting, human rights violations, 
mass killings, and sexual violence.11 In Kalyvas’s words, militias’ “reputation for atrocity 
is well established.”12 A similarly extensive body of literature has been arguing in support 
of a principal-agent paradigm premised on the argument that governments delegate their 
monopoly on legitimate violence to militias to avoid accountability.13 In accordance with 
the logic of delegation, states “hire” militias to distance themselves from human rights 
violations and abuses of civilian population and in order to maintain legitimacy in the 
eyes of international community.14 Since most PGMs exist outside of regular security 
structures, subcontracting violence to militias enables governments to avoid implication 
in war crimes or acts of civilian victimisation.15 
Existing research has related militias’ violent functions to their relationship with 
the state. Unlike other violent non-state agents, militias are mobilised, openly or covertly 
supported by governments, and deployed to perform “dirty jobs” for the state, which 
means that their relationship with state patrons is not only fundamental for the existence 
of PGMs, but is also crucial for governments’ ability to maintain their monopoly on 
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legitimate violence. In other words, governments avoid allocating too much power to 
militias, and militias avoid challenging the state. Bearing in mind that to various degrees 
most PGMs exist under the state’s umbrella, legitimation by governments – along with 
material and legal support – is essential for the PGMs’ survival.16 When militias become 
uncontrollable or redundant, or when governments choose to democratise and to 
transform relationships with their political opponents, militias might be disbanded or 
merged with regular security forces.17 
Since militias are first of all agents of violence, their mobilisation almost always 
coincides with violent conflicts. Carey, Colaresi and Mitchell18  argued that the 
emergence of PGMs is irrevocably associated with the potential of disorder or some other 
threat to government’s authority, such as possibility of coups d’état. For political regimes 
with weak or potentially unreliable regular armed forces, militias might function as 
“overlapping security institutions”,19 offering the regime an extra level of security. Along 
with functioning as convenient instruments of civilian victimisation,20 militias are 
commonly deployed in counterinsurgency (COIN) tasks.21 The PGMs advantages in 
COIN are manifold. Not only militias can be used to violently persecute civilian 
population during insurgencies and other episodes of civil unrest, but also they might be 
employed to effectively undermine rebel support bases, logistic networks and insurgent 
supply structures.22 Unlike conventional COIN forces, which are costly to train and 
maintain, militias have been described as a “budget option,” requiring minimum 
investment.23 Because most PGMs use recruitment patterns similar to rebels, or even tend 
to enlist rebel deserters and former insurgents, they often share the same recruitment 
pools and areas of operation with insurgents.24 Due to such local embeddedness, militias 
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tend to have much better access to local information and intelligence networks than 
regular security forces.25 It was also observed that, due to the PGMs’ lack of legal status, 
militia casualties are commonly presented as civilian victims of rebel attacks.26 Due to 
militias’ affiliation with governments and owing to the PGMs’ informal nature, literature 
on civil wars has thus far tended to ignore the role of militias, as independent actors, in 
conflict onset, incidence or termination.  
This current study contributes to the growing body of literature on pro-government 
militias by exploring an important but thus far understudied aspect of militia 
organisations: the end of PGMs activity. Through the set of hypotheses, which will be 
discussed in following sections, this article aims at improving our understanding of how 
and when militias meet their end.  
 
Civil war termination and PGMs 
 
A good portion of existing research on dissolution of non-state groups involved in armed 
conflicts either evolves from the literature on demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) of rebel organisations,27 or derives from the analysis of civil wars’ 
outcomes.28 The end of rebel organisations is closely associated with the outcome of an 
armed conflict. Studies on civil war commonly identify conflict outcomes in terms of 
lose, win and draw (or concession).29 The termination of conflict is a decisive period for 
rebel groups.30 Only when the war is over, it becomes obvious whether a rebel group is 
vanquished as a result of government’s victory, or it emerges as a winner either ousting 
the incumbent or imposing its conditions on the government.31 In both cases, the end of 
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conflict defines whether rebels cease to exist as an armed group and they either 
demobilise or merge with conventional armed forces.32 The draw (or concession) is 
followed either by the disarmament of rebels and their return to civilian life or by their 
engagement in formal politics.33 All three of these outcomes stipulate that rebel 
organisations rarely survive in their original form and capacity after the end of armed 
conflict. Hence, the end of rebel groups is closely associated with civil war termination.34  
Not much is known whether the same equation holds true for pro-government 
militias. Notwithstanding that the bulk of PGMs brought to life in the midst of civil wars 
are purposefully designed by governments, once created many militias tend to have a life 
of their own. Even those militia groups which remain under the state’s control might not 
be disbanded immediately after the end of conflict. Unlike rebels, PGMs’ interests are 
commonly aligned with the state’s agenda and even for those militias which choose to 
retain some distance from the state, cooperation with the government remains decisive. If 
dissolution of PGMs occurs, it may not qualitatively differ from disintegration of rebel 
groups.35 Empirical case studies have shown that when PGMs disband, they follow 
regular disarmament and reintegration processes.36 Similarly to rebels, they might also 
develop into political forces or, provided that the state seeks to make use of their military 
potential, they become formalised as part of state’s security structures, as was the case 
with Chechen kadyrovtsy units.37  
Along with disappearing or undergoing complete transformation, militias also might 
end up fracturing, declining, or partially transforming, i.e. repurposed as private 
security. A militia shifting its focus to local profiteering or private security under a 
different label may still continue to resist rebel forces in some way. For example, the 
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Philippine Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) were deployed against 
Moro rebels after the NPA threat declined.38 As opposed to a specific group being 
redeployed, state forces were using the same label for different groups in another part of 
the country. CAFGU in Luzon, northern Mindanao, and southern Mindanao was not the 
same organisation, but instead the same label placed on the private forces of local bosses 
seconded to state forces. In terms of disbanding, when a militia moves towards organised 
crime or local security, it does not necessarily cease anti-rebel activities. Less frequently, 
PGMs are known to change their status by switching to the rebel side. While the PGM 
hereby loses its pro-government status, it does not dissolve organisationally. In similar 
manner, rebel groups that are co-opted by governments transform into pro-government 
forces.39  
The agency of militias should not be downplayed in favour of a state-centric model. 
As Barter40 has suggested, we should not assume that groups resisting rebels are 
necessarily pro-government. Especially for indigenous militia forces that may resent 
legacies of state rule as well as the intrusion of rebel forces, or for criminal groups that 
may undermine state control, this is a flawed assumption. Therefore, it is not only the 
government’s “decision” to disband militias, but there are also local factors that may lead 
to the decline of militia forces. Although when governments are winning a conflict, they 
are more likely to disband militias, in such cases, communities are more likely to disband 
militias as well. With all of the above in mind, the question as to whether the PGMs’ 
disintegration is synonymous with termination of armed conflict remains unaddressed. 
A cursory examination of empirical case studies hints that it is not uncommon for 
PGMs to disband well before the end of civil war. The demobilisation of Colombia’s 
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AUC, reintegration of the Chechen kadyrovtsy militia into formal security forces and the 
dissolution of Spain’s anti-ETA Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion occurred well 
before the end of armed conflicts in either of these countries.41 These powerful militias 
were dissolved regardless of the fact that insurgencies, which these PGMs were created to 
tackle, were still raging.42 Other case studies demonstrate that the end of civil war and 
return to peaceful life, do not immediately lead to dissolution of militias. For example, 
Serb Beli Orlovi, Thai anti-communist “Task Force 80,” as well as Mali’s Ganda Koy, 
have all continued to exist well after the end of civil wars, during which they were 
conceived. These empirical observations suggest that in spite of PGMs’ intrinsic 
similarities with rebels, such as similar organisation and recruitment methods, 
disintegration of militia organisations follows a distinctively different pattern. 
All of the above suggests that termination of a civil war is unlikely to result in 
dissolution of pro-government militias and many militia groups tend to disappear before 
or well after the end of conflict. The main objective of this study is to examine when and 
under which conditions PGMs disband or persist in the context of civil wars. The 
following three hypotheses propose a set of conditions which might influence militia 
groups’ survival or demobilisation.  
 
Accounting for variation in PGMs’ demise  
 
Notwithstanding the PGMs’ perceived or actual independence from the state, militia 
groups emerging as a response to civil violence might be expected to retain close 
association with both state-sponsors and the conflict. Decisive victory of the incumbent 
 10 
 
resulting in rebel capitulation, such as the victory of the Sri Lankan government over the 
LTTE, is likely to put an end to civil war and reduce the regime’s resolve to supporting 
and financing militias. Provided that a militia group was mobilised with the sole purpose 
of waging counterinsurgency, complete disintegration of its opponents not only 
undermines the raison d'être of militias, but also weakens their support and recruitment 
bases. After the demise of rebel organisations, government might choose to either 
forcibly disband militias, or to incorporate them into its security structures. For instance, 
following the ousting of Taliban by the Northern Alliance in 2002, militias of many 
northern warlords were subsequently incorporated into Afghan armed forces.43 Even for 
those PGMs which have emerged as bottom-up community-based self-defence groups, 
such as Peru’s Rondas Campesinas, insurgents’ defeat almost certainly marks the 
beginning of the end. Both domestic and international pressure on post-conflict countries 
to ensure disarmament and demobilisation of all pro-government conflict-stakeholders is 
a robust incentive for the state to disband PGMs.  
An entirely different scenario may occur if the victorious side is not government, but 
rebels. The triumph of rebel forces terminates the incumbent’s rule and transforms the 
dyad. As soon as the regime falls, PGMs may find themselves in opposition to the new 
government and they either have to disband or shift sides with rebels, as was the case 
with the Rwandan interahamwe militias after the victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF). Soon after the RPF’s ascend to power, interahamwe groups transformed from pro-
government militias into anti-regime rebels. The impact of conflict termination as a result 
of (near) absolute victory by either side on militias is overwhelming and might be 
expected to put an end to the PGMs’ existence. Hence:  
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Hypothesis 1. Pro-government militias are more likely to dissolve the 
same year as the conflict terminates if civil war ends in decisive victory by 
either side of dyad. 
 
As detailed above, some PGMs fail to survive long enough to witness their patron’s 
victory or defeat. The examples of Colombia’s AUC, the Chechen death squads, Turkish 
anti-PKK village guards, as well as of numerous Sri Lankan anti-LTTE militias (Green 
Tigers, Black Cats and Yellow Cats) show that even powerful militia groups with a 
successful counterinsurgency record may meet their end well before the termination of 
civil war. In the context of civil wars, PGMs not only perform “dirty jobs” for the 
government, but they are also a liability for the state. Once a PGM is created, or co-opted 
to pursue state’s interests, state-patrons have to invest heavily in training, supplying and, 
most of all, ensuring the loyalty of militias. Although maintaining a militia has been 
described as a “budget” solution to expanding numbers of regular military personnel,44 
purchasing the loyalty of rogue militia leaders can be a costly and risky investment.  
Maintaining some sort of control over militias becomes even more challenging as 
their numbers increase. For example, at the height of their activity, Colombia’s right-
wing AUC paramilitaries were active across over 60% of the country. Some of smaller 
AUC units were not accountable to the government.45 Regardless of their 
counterinsurgency functions, PGMs are also notorious for engaging in criminal activities, 
including but not limited to drug trade, smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. These 
activities contradict government’s interests and link PGMs with organised crime. In other 
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cases, militias might spin out of control and start pursuing their own agendas, neglecting 
and even harming the interests of their patron. The state might also lose interest in 
maintaining a PGM, if the militia has fulfilled, or failed to fulfil, its function. This is 
particularly relevant to those militias, which were mobilised to achieve certain short-term 
goals, such as to commit genocide or mass killings. Disbanding a militia with “bad 
reputation” can be strategically important for the government in order to improve its 
image abroad and to show the population and rebels its will to engage in conflict 
resolution. These and other factors may affect the government-militia symbiosis. The 
change of government’s “mood” towards militias becomes even more probable in longer 
civil wars, when governments have more time to become disillusioned with militias. 
Hence, supporting militias might be a short-term strategy that may reverse over the 
course of a protracted conflict.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Since militias are more likely to be become a burden for 
governments in long-lasting conflicts, the likelihood of PGMs disbanding 
before the end of conflict increases with longer civil war duration. 
 
Since the “early” end is just one of the possibilities of what might happen to PGMs 
created to assist governments in civil wars, militias might as well continue functioning 
well after the conflict formally ended. While incentives for governments to disband 
PGMs before the end of civil war are manifold, there might be even more reasons to 
suspend militia activity once the conflict is over.46 However, not all conflicts end in a 
decisive victory by either side. Provided that government succeeds in delivering a heavy 
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blow to the rebels, but still fails to eradicate the insurgency, the threat of splinter groups 
or low-attrition conflict would remain. The government’s ability to rely on loyal and 
efficient militia force in order to wipe out the remnants of resistance might prove 
essential at that stage of post-conflict transformation. Things become even more 
complicated if rebels win the confrontation without ousting the regime.  
The situation defined as “draw” refers to a condition when rebels succeed in securing 
concessions from the government, such as opportunity to participate in political processes 
or territorial autonomy. Bearing in mind that rebels emerge as the side achieving some 
part (or all) of their goals, the draw is defined here as (incomplete) victory of the rebel 
side. Although demobilisation and even reintegration of rebel forces may accompany 
such an outcome, government would hardly be satisfied with the rebels’ victory. 
Preserving PGMs as a measure of precaution and a safeguard in case if conflict erupts in 
near future, might seem as a wise decision. Notwithstanding the termination of civil war, 
PGMs might still be useful in harassing and persecuting former rebels. They can also be 
deployed against other political opponents of the regime. For example, the Philippines’ 
CAFGU were created to fight leftist CPP rebels, but were also used against Moro 
insurgents. It might seem even more important for governments to keep PGMs in cases 
when no comprehensive agreement on conflict resolution has been achieved. Any form of 
incomplete conflict settlement, such as ceasefire, serves as a robust incentive for the state 
to preserve militias. Unlike regular troops, militias are easy to conceal and exclude from 
disarmament or demobilization agreements.  
Even if PGMs have to be demobilised, informal links with government can still be 
preserved and maintained over long periods. Sierra Leone government’s connections with 
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Kamajors militia, which were fostered even during periods of peace, is a good example 
of state retaining informal links with demobilised militias.47 In times of peace, militias 
can be employed in non-combat roles, as either community guards or extra-state security 
forces. Government could be particularly willing to keep PGMs if the conflict was short 
and ended in stalemate. Provided that conflict’s duration did not span across decades, the 
chance that militias would spin out of control and become rogue is lower than in long-
lasting civil wars. Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 3. Governments may decide to preserve militias, if they fail to 
settle conflicts in their favour, and therefore militias tend to survive longer 
in context of unresolved conflicts.  
 
Methodology  
 
The above hypotheses are tested using a sample of 220 pro-government militias in 75 
civil wars. The data set on militias was compiled from the Pro-Government Militia 
Database (PGMD)48 that identifies 332 PGMs active from 1981 to 2007. The PGMD 
consists of all pro-government militias active during the above period, including groups 
which never participated in civil wars. The data on the PGM involvement in civil wars 
from 1981 to 2011 was adopted from Stanton.49 Since the PGMD offers information 
about the presence/absence or the inactivity/activity status of militia groups, only active 
PGMs were included in the data set. For civil war data, I used the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) 
 15 
 
v.4-2015. A standard definition of civil war as a conflict with at least 1,000 battle-related 
deaths50 has been employed to select conflicts with militia involvement. A total of 75 
civil wars were identified as conflicts with the presence of pro-government militias. Only 
16 conflicts were ongoing. While each civil war included in the sample had at least one 
PGM, over 30% of civil wars had multiple militia groups involved. Among PGMs 
involved in active conflicts, only 15 militia groups were found active. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
The dependent variable of this study is the termination of PGM activity. The original 
PGMD data on the end of militia activity was combined with the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset v.-201051  in order to produce a cross-sectional data set with pro-
government militia groups as the unit of analysis. Civil war termination is measured by 
the precise date when each conflict ended, as estimated by the UCDP. The dissolution of 
PGMs is measured as the exact date when each militia group disbanded, or in the absence 
of such data, as last recorded activity. The end of PGMs is tested on three dichotomous 
dummy variables: (1) correlation, (2) PGMs end before the conflict’s termination, and (3) 
PGMs disband after the end of civil war. For H1, which examines the correlation between 
the end of PGM activity and civil war termination, the number of observations was 
reduced to 138. A PGM is coded as disbanded the same year as conflict ends if it ceases 
its activity and/or dissolves within a 12-month period after the end of civil war. For H2, a 
militia group was coded as 1 if it was inactive before conflict termination and as 0 for all 
active militia groups. Each PGM was identified as dissolved before the end of civil war if 
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it was disbanded (ceased its activity) at least 12 months before the termination of conflict. 
A similar coding procedure was applied towards those PGMs which continued to 
function after the end of civil war (1=active; 0=other): PGMs dissolved later than 12 
months after the end of civil war are presented as active after the conflict termination. To 
address the problem of endogeneity, only PGMs created a year before the start of civil 
conflict were included in the sample. In other words, militia groups mobilised well before 
the onset of conflict, but deployed against the rebels with the start of conflict violence, 
might be expected to continue functioning even after the end of conflict. To account for 
variation in the typology of PGMs, I borrowed data on informal and semi-official militias 
from Carey et al. (2013).52 According to the authors,53 the difference between these two 
types of PGMs is the degree of their affiliation to the state.  
 
Independent variables 
 
To test each of these hypotheses, a number of explanatory variables were introduced. 
Firstly, the data on victory side is borrowed from the UCDP conflict termination data set. 
The variable provides information whether victorious side in each terminated civil war 
was government or rebels. Conflict duration is a count of conflict years. The data on 
conflict incompatibility was taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data set and it 
distinguishes between incompatibility over government and over territory. Conflict 
intensity is a dummy variable that measures cumulative intensity of conflict, based on the 
data from the UCDP/PRIO data set. Following the UCDP’s terminology, a civil war is 
coded as “low-intensity conflict” if the conflict has not exceeded 1,000 battle-related 
 17 
 
deaths since its onset and as a “major war” if a 1,000 deaths threshold was reached. This 
study controls for conflict intensity only for the year when a PGM ceases to exist. The 
data on civil war outcome is also taken from the UCDP conflict termination data set. It is 
a factor variable, which measures four possible outcomes of conflict: peace agreement, 
ceasefire with conflict resolution, ceasefire, victory, and low activity.  
 
Control variables  
 
Which other factors might be expected to affect PGMs’ demise? Studies on insurgency 
termination and civil war duration converge on the argument that democracy, ethnicity, 
religion, terrain, economic and human development have an impact on the outcome of 
civil war.54 To measure the impact of regime type, I use Polity IV data set. Variables on 
religious fractionalisation and ethnic exclusion (percentages of population), as well as the 
measure on the percentage of mountainous terrain, are taken from Fearon and Laitin.55 
Another variable added from Fearon and Laitin’s data set is a dummy on whether a civil 
war is an ethnic conflict. A log of real GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank 
database. The data on human development is from the State Fragility Index and Matrix 
2014 (SFIM) provided by the Centre for Systemic Peace.56 
To test the hypotheses, several statistical methods are employed. Firstly, the 
hypotheses are tested using descriptive statistics to analyse the data set. Since each of 
three outcome variables is bivariate, cross-tabulating the data shows how many PGMs 
disappear before, after and simultaneously with the end of conflict. Secondly, the 
hypotheses are tested through logit regression models, designed to control for each 
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outcome variable. The results of logit regression are then checked for robustness using 
Cox proportional hazards estimates. A semi-parametric method was chosen because the 
data contains censored observations, which may not be captured well by parametric or 
nonparametric models. Besides, the end of PGMs is a transition which may or may not 
occur at a certain point of time. A PGM remains in the event (risk) set while it is active; it 
enters the failure set once (and when) the group is dissolved and it disappears from the 
risk set if the group does not disband during the observed period.     
 
Empirical analysis 
 
To start with, the hypotheses are tested using descriptive statistics. The cross-tabulation 
analysis presented in Table 1 offers support to the key argument of this study: only 8% of 
all PGMs were disbanded in the same year as civil wars ended in their respective 
countries. A greater number of PGMs (40%) ended their activity at various periods before 
the termination of conflict. Almost one third of militias continued functioning after the 
end of civil wars. This number includes PGMs currently active in countries where civil 
wars ended.  
 
Table 1. Correlation between PGM end and civil war termination  
 
There appears to be little correlation between the termination of civil wars and 
dissolution of pro-government militias during the observed period. Instead, as shown in 
Figure 1, the highest number of civil wars’ termination occurred in a period between 
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1995 and 1997, when the end of numerous conflicts of post-communist region coincided 
with the termination of a number of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa. The bulk of PGMs 
conceived during these conflicts continued functioning for almost another decade when 
the fourth wave of democratisation in Central Eastern Europe brought an end to PGMs in 
many transitioning countries, such as the Balkan states and Georgia.  
 
Figure 1. Time-series correlation between civil war termination and dissolution of PGMs 
 
Table 2 presents the results from three logit regression models. Models 1 and 3 include 
all explanatory variables and controls. Model 2 is designed similarly with the exception 
of conflict outcome variable, which is omitted because the conflict outcome is not likely 
to influence the dissolution of PGMs before the end of civil war. The Akaike’s 
information criterion (AIC) was calculated for each model; it shows that the best model 
fit had been achieved in Model 1. Calculating margins in Model 1 provides further 
support for the key argument: the probability of PGMs disbanding the same year as the 
conflict ends is only three percent. The likelihood of PGMs disappearing before the end 
of conflict increases to 23%, while the probability of militias ending their activity after 
the termination of civil wars is at around 16%.  
 
Table 2. Logit regression estimates of PGMs and civil war termination  
 
The results for Model 1, which explores why PGMs cease to exist the same year as 
the conflict ends, do not support Hypothesis 1. The coefficients for either incumbent or 
 20 
 
rebel victory are statistically insignificant and rather low (negative for government) for 
both types of conflict termination. Similarly, the specific types of conflict outcomes offer 
no conclusive results. Although ceasefire with conflict resolution has strong positive 
relationship with the dissolution of PGMs in the same year as the end of conflict, it has 
no statistical significance. Hence, the conflict outcome is unlikely to offer a reliable 
explanation as to why PGMs disintegrate the year when the conflict ends.  
There is, however, a degree of negative correspondence between the PGM end and 
conflict duration, which suggests that PGMs are not likely to disband immediately after 
the end of civil war in protracted conflicts. A cursory examination of cases when the end 
of PGMs activity coincided with civil war termination, shows that only 21% of PGMs 
involved in protracted conflicts were disbanded the same year as the conflict ended, 
whereas the rest of PGMs’ end cases (79%) occurred in conflicts lasting less than a 
decade. With the exception of ethnic exclusion that remains in negative direction, control 
variables for Model 1 are not statistically significant.    
Second hypothesis predicts that PGMs disband before civil war end in protracted 
conflicts. The findings of the statistical analyses lend support to this assumption. In 
Model 2, the end of PGM activity is associated with conflict duration. The coefficient for 
conflict duration is positive and statistically significant at .001 level, indicating that 
PGMs indeed disintegrate faster in protracted conflicts. The early end of PGM activity 
also has strong positive relationship with conflict intensity. More specifically, it shows 
that major civil war has high statistically significant probability of inducing the PGMs’ 
termination. This is an interesting finding; as high conflict intensity might be assumed to 
increase the government’s demand for PGMs’ services. One probable explanation might 
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be in the government’s loss of control over the escalation of violence. Indeed, a number 
of PGMs disbanded well before the end of conflict, such as Angola’s Vigilante Brigades, 
Colombia’s AUC and the “Soldiers from my Town,” Philippines’ Tadtads, and Sri 
Lankan “The Eagles of the Highlands,” ceased to exist precisely when numbers of 
conflict-related deaths were increasing.57 A closer look at the data shows that almost one 
third (30%) of PGMs disbanded before the end of civil wars were terminated in the midst 
of large-scale warfare with numbers of battle-related deaths per year reaching over 1,000. 
However, searching for explanations whether the PGM involvement leads to higher rates 
of conflict-associated violence is beyond the scope of this study.  
The variable on victory side was included in this model for its predictive value. 
Bearing in mind that some PGMs ceased to exist just one or two years before conflict 
termination, accounting for conflict winner may offer some explanation as to why these 
PGMs perished. The association between rebel victory and the PGMs’ early end is both 
statistically significant and negative, pointing out that PGMs are not likely to disband 
early in those conflicts which would end in rebel victory. Only 27% of all PGMs 
disbanded before the end of conflict were involved in civil wars ending in rebels’ victory. 
By contrast, almost half of PGMs dissolved before the end of civil wars were engaged in 
conflicts won by the government. This finding offers some explanation with regard to the 
association between the early end of PGMs and conflict intensity. In other words, as 
governments are closer to winning the war they are likely to become less reliant on 
militias and more inclined to disband them. It also provides additional explanation for the 
above mentioned finding on the relationship between the increase of battle-related deaths 
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and dissolution of militias: the increase of conflict-associated violence may be related not 
only to the government’s loss of control, but also to its success in routing out rebels.  
In case if incumbent is successful in inflicting a high number of casualties on rebels, 
it may seek to strengthen its monopoly over the use of violence at the expense of non-
state actors. While data on the ratio of government vs. rebel casualties do not exist for all 
cases in the data set, the above assumption still lends some support for H2. In other 
words, as found by Fearon,58 longer civil wars are commonly fought over land issues 
(“sons of the soil” rebellions) and they tend to be of low intensity and low casualty rate. 
These conflicts, however, are characterised by occasional eruptions of violence,59 such as 
during the last phase of Sri Lankan civil war. It is during these periods of increased 
violence that governments may decide to dissolve militias either due to fears of losing 
control over conflict escalation, or in order to monopolise its control over the use of 
violence. For example, Colombian government’s efforts to disband AUC paramilitaries 
coincided both with the rise of conflict-related violence and with the government’s 
increased attempts to take full control over the monopoly of violence.  
In terms of controls, mountainous terrain and ethnic conflict are statistically 
significant and positive, hinting that PGMs are less likely to survive until the end of 
conflict in ethnic civil wars fought on rough terrain. Fearon and Laitin60 hypothesised that 
ethnic rebellions, many of which are fought in remote areas with harsh terrain, tend to 
last longer and are harder for incumbents to defeat. PGMs might be mobilised in such 
conflicts in hope of weakening the rebels but as prospects of fast victory decrease, 
governments become more willing to disband militias. Lastly, higher GDP per capita has 
 23 
 
strong association with the PGMs’ early end, showing that militias in more economically 
developed countries meet their end earlier.  
The last hypothesis posits that PGMs survive beyond the end of civil war if civil war 
remains unresolved. Model 3 tests this hypothesis and only partially lends support to 
these arguments. The analysis of findings for conflict outcome variable reveals that there 
is a strong association between victory (by either side) and PGMs’ persistence beyond the 
end of conflict. A weaker, but positive, degree of association could be observed between 
the PGM survival and conflicts ending either in peace agreement (without conflict 
resolution) or in a low-attrition conflict. Rebel victory has positive but low and 
statistically insignificant relationship with PGMs survival, while government victory is in 
negative direction. The analysis of data set reveals that over half of PGMs survived in 
countries which experienced conflicts won by rebels.  
These findings indicate that conflicts culminating in ceasefire or low-level 
insurgency, are likely to lead to PGMs survival after civil wars end. This confirms that 
governments may choose to preserve militias in order to re-deploy them in case if the 
dormant conflict escalates. One notable example of government preserving militias in the 
aftermath of an unresolved conflict is the recent conflict between Ukrainian government 
and Russian-backed separatists in Eastern Ukraine. As the conflict was put on hold by a 
ceasefire agreement, the government continues to maintain militia battalions, some of 
which only formally were incorporated in regular army. There might be other reasons 
why governments decide to continue maintaining a militia force, such as deploying 
militias as a coup deterrent. This assumption is consistent with findings by Carey et al.61 
that coup prevention is an important function of PGMs. In addition, these findings 
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indicate that governments are keen to preserve PGMs as a “precaution measure” even 
after the end of conflict, and not only before and during the conflict.  
Model 3 produced two more significant and noteworthy findings. Firstly, as expected 
conflict incompatibility is strongly associated with PGM persistence. The analysis of data 
reveals that difference between incompatibility over government and over territory in 
conflicts which resulted in PGMs’ survival is insignificant: 32 conflicts were fought over 
government and 36 over territory. This finding suggests that it is not the category of 
incompatibility62 that accounts for the persistence of PGMs but the fact that the conflict 
incompatibility remained unaddressed. This finding bolsters the claim that unresolved 
conflicts are more likely to witness the continuity of militia activity.  
Secondly, there is a robust statistically significant relationship between PGMs’ 
survival and low-intensity conflict, demonstrating that militias have more chances to 
continue operating in countries, which experience low-intensity civil war. A closer look 
at these cases shows that, 89% of all surviving PGMs in post-conflict countries were 
involved in low-intensity conflicts. As low intensity civil wars tend to last longer and 
often end in rebels’ securing some sort of concession from the government, it explains 
the governments’ tendency to preserve militias even after the end of active (combat) 
phase of civil war. 
Amongst controls, in contrast to Model 2, both mountainous terrain and ethnic 
conflict are in negative direction. Bearing in mind that conflict duration is below 0 and 
insignificant, this observation indicates that PGMs are more likely to survive after the 
conflict in countries where civil wars were short, not ethnically motivated and possibly 
fought conventionally or semi-conventionally. Typical examples of such conflicts are 
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coups, or confrontations between rival political factions, similar to Sierra Leone’s and 
Congolese civil wars, or Haiti’s and Ghana’s military coups. Unlike the “sons of the soil” 
rebellions or similar long-lasting ethnic conflicts, shorter and more conventionally fought 
civil wars take place in urban centres rather than in mountains. As ethnic fractionalisation 
variable remains strong and significant, ethnically diverse societies are likely to 
experience the persistence of militias. Even if the recent conflict was not about ethnic 
incompatibility, the degree of ethnic fractionalisation in the country may explain the 
incumbent’s decision to preserve PGMs in case if ethnic tensions develop. For example, 
similarly to the Philippines’ CAFGU – deployed against both ethnic and non-ethnic 
insurgents – Israeli Village Guards and Settlers militias were used in conflicts with both 
nationalist and Islamist Palestinian militants. Hence, ethnic diversity even in the absence 
of ethnic conflict offers an incentive to preserve PGMs. 
I have also tested the effects of two sub-categories of PGMs – informal and semi-
official PGMs on each statistical model. Due to a small sample, the semi-official category 
produced no results. Informal PGMs remained insignificant and hardly above 0 in all 
three models. Since the presence of these two variables had no effect on either model fit 
or on the results, they were excluded from the analysis.  
    
Robustness check 
 
To assess the robustness of these results the three models were tested using Cox 
proportional hazards estimates. The findings of the survival analysis are presented in 
Table 3. The model specifications are the same as in Table 2. Similarly to logit findings, 
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duration is statistically significant in Model 1. Hazard ratio for duration is below 1, 
suggesting that the risk of PGMs disbanding the same year as conflict ends is fairly low 
in longer conflicts. This can be equated to findings in Table 2.63 The only other finding of 
Model 1 that corresponds to logit results pertains to ethnic exclusion, which remains in 
negative direction in both analyses. In contrast to logit model, Model 1 in Table 4 
produced strong and statistically significant effects for variations of conflict outcome. In 
line with H1, the model reports that the risk of PGMs’ end increases by 587% if conflict 
terminates in victory. The result for peace agreement is even higher (at 676%). These 
results suggest that both peace agreement and victory increase the risk of PGMs’ 
dissolving once the conflict is over. As both of these outcomes result in almost certain 
end of the conflict – unlike different types of ceasefire agreements – these finding lends 
support to H1 that expected absolute victory by either side to lead to militia 
disappearance.    
 
Table 3. Cox proportional hazards estimates of PGMs and civil war termination  
 
Model 2 offers support to H2 and produces results somewhat corresponding to logit 
regression models. The risk of PGMs ending their activity before the end of civil war is 
40% in longer conflicts. Rebel victory is another statistically significant variable in that 
model, and just as in Table 3 it is in negative direction. The model shows positive hazard 
ratio for major civil war, but the result has no statistical significance. In addition, these 
findings were estimated by parametric models (Weibull), which yielded similar results 
and therefore are not shown.  
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Conclusion  
 
The existing literature on pro-government militias has thus far offered few explanations 
with regard to when and why militias deployed to fight civil wars cease to exist. This 
article conducted a nuanced statistical analysis of the process of militia dissolution and of 
factors affecting that process. The findings demonstrate that there is little correlation 
between civil war termination and the end of militia activity. While only a small number 
of PGMs disband immediately in the aftermath of conflict termination, far greater 
numbers of militias cease to exist before the end civil war, or continue operating well 
after the end of conflict. Although mobilised at various stages of armed conflicts, pro-
government militias show a tendency of disintegrating prior to the end of conflict. They 
also show a strong propensity to over live civil wars. It was hypothesised in this study 
that the end of PGM activity can be explained by such factors as conflict duration, 
outcome, and intensity. The findings indicate that each of these variables helps to explain 
either the end or endurance of pro-government militias in (post) civil war environments.  
As most cases of correlation between the PGMs’ end and the termination of civil war 
occurred in shorter conflicts, conflict duration helps to understand in which type of civil 
wars militias might be expected to dissolve immediately after the end of conflict. 
Duration is similarly important to explain the early disappearance of PGMs, because 
higher numbers of militia groups tend to dissolve before the end of civil war in long-
lasting conflicts. This shows that those PGMs which succeed in surviving after the end of 
conflict are more likely to do so in shorter civil wars. The results of statistical tests reveal 
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that conflict outcome has decisive impact on both end and persistence of PGMs. Thus far 
few militias were disbanded in conflicts ending in rebels’ securing concessions from the 
government. Hence, a strong relationship between the survival of militias and the rebel 
victory, particularly in shorter civil wars, hints that state’s failure to terminate the conflict 
in its favour serves as a robust incentive for incumbents to continue supporting PGMs. 
PGMs also seem to have less chances to survive large-scale civil wars characterised by 
high levels of conflict-associated violence. By contrast, most of surviving after the 
conflict’s termination militias were involved in low-intensity civil wars. Conflict 
incompatibility seems to be of little significance either for the correlation between 
disintegration of PGMs and the wars’ end or for militias’ pre-conflict end dissolution. 
Nonetheless the failure to resolve conflict incompatibility emerges as an incentive for 
incumbents to preserve militias after the end of conflict. 
Bearing in mind the explanatory weight of the above variables, it is possible to 
outline two scenarios conducive to PGMs termination, or the lack thereof. Firstly, major 
civil wars with high numbers of battle-related deaths, that last less than a decade and 
culminate in a decisive victory by either side of the dyad, and often followed by an 
effective conflict resolution, tend to witness the highest number of PGMs disbanded. 
Secondly, short, less intensive and inconclusive civil wars encourage the endurance of 
militias. Unresolved disagreements amongst the belligerents and unsatisfied with the 
conflict outcome governments are potentially conducive towards the PGMs’ survival. 
These findings nonetheless offer only partial explanation about the termination of militia 
activity in protracted low-intensity conflicts, termed in the literature as “the sons of the 
soil” rebellions. This can be explained by the fact that many of such conflicts are still 
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ongoing. For example, Mexico’s conflict with the EZLN rebels, Myanmar’s 
confrontation with Kachin and Karen rebels, as well as Mali’s long-lasting troubles with 
Tuareg insurgents, have been accompanied by both the persistence and disintegration of 
militia groups which emerged in the course of these protracted low-attrition conflicts. In 
other words, once some militia groups involved in the “sons of the soil” wars disappear, 
others emerge. However, further research is needed in order to explain the dynamics of 
emergence and disappearance of PGMs in protracted low-intensity civil wars.   
This study contributes to the growing field of research on pro-government militias by 
offering a number of important implications for theory and practice. Keeping in mind that 
the research on PGMs remains in its infancy, the current study demonstrates that, unlike 
termination of rebel organisations, PGMs’ end is weakly associated with the end of civil 
war. Militias’ endurance is conditioned by such factors as conflict duration, outcome, and 
intensity. These variables are not only associated with militias’ demise prior to the end of 
armed conflict, but also provide some explanatory insights into the PGMs’ post-conflict 
continuity. As violent non-state actors engaged in civil wars, militias might prove 
resilient to changes and can continue functioning in post-conflict environments. Future 
research could explore the factors accounting for the demise of those PGMs, which 
outlived civil wars. Lastly, this study has demonstrated that there is an observable pattern 
in disappearance of PGMs, which correlates with the type of conflict. This may enable 
both researchers and practitioners to improve their understanding of the PGMs’ role in 
armed conflicts.    
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